Connectionist computations of intuitionistic reasoning  by d’Avila Garcez, Artur S. et al.
Theoretical Computer Science 358 (2006) 34–55
www.elsevier.com/locate/tcs
Connectionist computations of intuitionistic reasoning
Artur S. d’Avila Garceza,∗, Luís C. Lambb, Dov M. Gabbayc
aDepartment of Computing, City University London, London EC1V 0HB, UK
bInstitute of Informatics, Federal University of Rio Grande do Sul, Porto Alegre, RS 91501-970, Brazil
cDepartment of Computer Science, King’s College London, London WC2R 2LS, UK
Received 7 June 2005; received in revised form 20 October 2005; accepted 4 November 2005
Communicated by C. Torras
Abstract
The construction of computational models with provision for effective learning and added reasoning is a fundamental problem
in computer science. In this paper, we present a new computational model for integrated reasoning and learning that combines
intuitionistic reasoning and neural networks. We use ensembles of neural networks to represent intuitionistic theories, and show that
for each intuitionistic theory and intuitionistic modal theory there exists a corresponding neural network ensemble that computes a
ﬁxed-point semantics of the theory. This provides a massively parallel model for intuitionistic reasoning. In our model, the neural
networks can be trained from examples to adapt to new situations using standard neural learning algorithms, thus providing a unifying
foundation for intuitionistic reasoning, knowledge representation, and learning.
© 2006 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
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1. Introduction
Automated reasoning and learning theory have been the subject of intensive investigation since the early devel-
opments in computer science [43,54]. However, while (machine) learning has been mainly developed by the use of
quantitative and connectionist approaches (see e.g. [34,42,45,59]), the reasoning component of intelligent systems
has been developed using the formalisms of classical and non-classical logics (see e.g. [11,25,30]). More recently,
the acceptance of the need for systems that integrate reasoning and learning into the same foundation, and the evo-
lution of the ﬁelds of cognitive and neural computation, has led to a number of proposals integrating both features
[12,14,19,32,39,50,53,56].
An effective representation of integrated reasoning and learning can be attained bymeans of neural-symbolic learning
systems [19,20,22]. Neural-symbolic learning systems concern the application of problem-speciﬁc symbolic knowledge
within the connectionist paradigm. By integrating logic and neural networks, they may provide (i) a logical charac-
terisation of a connectionist system, (ii) a connectionist (parallel) implementation of a logic, or (iii) a hybrid learning
system bringing together advantages from connectionism and symbolic reasoning. In this paper, we are concerned with
item (ii) above for the case of intuitionistic reasoning, as detailed below.
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Until recently, neural-symbolic systems were not able to fully represent, reason and learn expressive languages
other than propositional and fragments of ﬁrst-order logic [14,52]. However, in [20–23] a new approach to knowledge
representation and reasoning within the neural-symbolic paradigm has been proposed, namely Connectionist Modal
Logic (CML). In [23], it was shown that modal logics can be effectively represented in neural networks. In [20,21],
connectionist frameworks for reasoning and learning about time and knowledge were outlined. Well-known distributed
knowledge representation problems [25] were then shown to be effectively represented and solved by CML in [22].
Intuitionistic logical systemshave been advocated bymany as providing adequate logical foundations for computation
[2,3,17,26,37,41,47]. We argue, therefore, that intuitionism could also play an important part in neural computation.
In this paper, we follow the research path outlined in [20,23] to develop a neural-symbolic computational model
for integrated reasoning, representation, and learning of intuitionistic knowledge. We concentrate on reasoning and
knowledge representation issues, which set the scene for connectionist intuitionistic learning, since effective knowledge
representation precedes any learning algorithm. Nevertheless, we base the representation on standard, simple neural
network architectures, aiming at further developments on effective, experimental learning.
In order to compute intuitionistic knowledge in a connectionist framework, we set up ensembles of Connectionist
Inductive Learning and Logic Programming (C-ILP) networks [18,19] to compute a ﬁxed-point semantics of intu-
itionistic programs (or intuitionistic modal programs). The networks are set up by an Intuitionistic Algorithm or by an
Intuitionistic Modal Algorithm, both introduced in this paper. The proofs that the algorithms produce neural networks
that compute the ﬁxed-point semantics of their associated intuitionistic theories are then given. The networks can be
trained from examples with the use of standard learning algorithms such as backpropagation [49], the neural learn-
ing algorithm most successfully applied to real-world problems, e.g., in bioinformatics and pattern recognition [5,7].
We also illustrate the effectiveness of the proposed computational model using an application in a typical distributed
knowledge representation scenario [25].
The combination of intuitionistic reasoning and neural networks thus contributes to the integration of knowledge
representation, computation, and learning. In [57], Valiant states that a major challenge for computer science is the
characterisation of a semantics for cognitive computation, 1 as follows: the aim here is to identify a way of looking at
and manipulating commonsense knowledge that is consistent with and can support what we consider to be the two most
fundamental aspects of intelligent cognitive behaviour: the ability to learn from experience, and the ability to reason
from what has been learned. We are therefore seeking a semantics of knowledge that can computationally support
the basic phenomena of intelligent behaviour [57]. Valiant also describes the features of the semantic formalisation
needed for supporting learning and reasoning: one set of requirements [for a semantics to be adequate for commonsense
reasoning] is that it should support integrated algorithms for learning and reasoning that are computationally tractable
and have some non-trivial scope.Another requirement is that it has a principledway of ensuring that the knowledge-base
from which reasoning is done is robust, in the sense that errors in the deductions are at least controllable [57].
Aiming to attend to the requirements put forward by Valiant, this paper provides a uniﬁed computational foundation
for neural networks and intuitionistic reasoning. Knowledge is expressed by a symbolic language, whereas deduction
and learning are carried out by a robust, connectionist engine. Ultimately, we seek to contribute to the long term aim
of representing expressive symbolic formalisms in learning systems [55], and to the characterisation of a semantics for
cognitive computation [56] by means of neural-symbolic integration.
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. In Section 2, we present the basic concepts of intuitionistic
reasoning and artiﬁcial neural networks used throughout the paper. In Section 3, we introduce the Intuitionistic Algo-
rithm, which translates intuitionistic theories into neural networks, and prove that the network computes a ﬁxed-point
semantics of the given theory (thus showing that the translation is correct). In Section 4, we introduce the Intuitionis-
tic Modal Algorithm, which translates intuitionistic modal theories into neural networks, and prove that the network
computes a ﬁxed-point semantics of the given (modal) theory. In Section 5 we illustrate the application of the pro-
posed model in a typical distributed knowledge representation testbed. Section 6 concludes and discusses directions for
future work.
1 Valiant’s paper [57] was published in the Journal of the ACM, special issue celebrating its 50th anniversary. In that issue, the editor-in-chief at
the time (J. Halpern) invited winners of the Turing Award and Nevanlinna Prize to discuss up to three problems these prominent researchers thought
would be major challenges for computer science in the next 50 years.
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Fig. 1. The processing unit or neuron.
2. Background
In this section, we present some basic concepts of artiﬁcial neural networks and intuitionistic programs that will be
used throughout the paper.
2.1. Artiﬁcial neural networks
The artiﬁcial neural networks that this paper is concerned with are directed graphs with the following structure:
a unit (or neuron) in the graph is characterised, at time t, by its input vector Ii(t), its input potential Ui(t), its
activation state Ai(t), and its outputOi(t). The units of the network are interconnected via a set of directed and
weighted connections such that if there is a connection from unit i to unit j then Wji ∈R denotes the weight of this
connection. The input potential of neuron i at time t (Ui(t)) is obtained by computing a weighted sum for neuron i
such that Ui(t) =∑j Wij Ii(t) (see Fig. 1). The activation state Ai(t) of neuron i at time t —a bounded real or integer
number— is then given by the neuron’s activation function hi such that Ai(t) = hi(Ui(t)). Typically, hi is either a
linear function, a non-linear (step) function, or a sigmoid function (e.g.: tanh(x)). In addition, i (an extra weight with
input always ﬁxed at 1) is known as the threshold of neuron i. We say that neuron i is active at time t if Ai(t)> i .
Finally, the neuron’s output value Oi(t) is given by its output function fi(Ai(t)). Usually, fi is the identity function.
The units of a neural network can be organised in layers. A n-layer feedforward network, n2, is an acyclic graph
containing one input layer, n − 2 hidden layers, and one output layer, with connections between successive layers.
When n = 3, we say that the network is a single-hidden-layer network. When each unit occurring in the ith layer is
connected to each unit occurring in the i + 1st layer, we say that the network is fully connected.
The most interesting properties of a neural network do not arise from the functionality of each neuron, but from the
collective effect of interconnecting the neurons. Let r and s denote the number of neurons occurring in the input and
output layers of a feedforward network N . The network computes a function  : Rr → Rs . In the case of single-
hidden-layer networks, the computation of  occurs as follows: at time t1, the input vector is presented to the input
layer. At time t2, the input vector is propagated through to the hidden layer (so that the units in the hidden layer can
update their input potential and activation state). At time t3, the hidden layer activation state is propagated through to
the output layer (and the units in the output layer update their input potential and activation state). At time t4, the output
vector can be read off the network’s output layer. In addition, most neural models have a learning rule, responsible
for changing the weights of the network progressively so that it learns to approximate  given a number of training
examples (input vectors and their respective target output vectors, in the case of supervised learning [49]).
In this paper, we concentrate on single-hidden-layer networks, since they can approximate any (Borel) measurable
function arbitrarily well, regardless of the dimension of the input space [15]. In this sense, single-hidden-layer networks
are approximators of virtually any function of interest. We also use bipolar semi-linear activation functions h(x) =
2/(1 + e−x) − 1 with inputs in {−1, 1}. Throughout, we will use 1 to denote truth-value true, and −1 to denote
truth-value false.
2.2. Intuitionistic logic and programs
Intuitionistic logics are considered by many authors as providing adequate logical foundations for computation
[1,3,17,26,47,51]. Intuitionistic logic was originally developed by Brouwer, and later by Heyting and Kolmogorov (see
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[16] for a historical account). In intuitionistic logics, a statement that there exists a proof of a proposition x is only
made if there is a constructive method of the proof of x. One of the consequences of Brouwer’s ideas is the rejection
of the law of the excluded middle, namely  ∨ ¬, since one cannot always state that there is a proof of  or of its
negation, as accepted in classical logic and in (classical) mathematics. The development of these ideas and applications
in mathematics has led to developments in constructive mathematics and has inﬂuenced several lines of research on
logic and computing science [3,16,41].
An intuitionistic languageL includes propositional letters (atoms)p, q, r, . . . , the connectives¬,∧, and an intuition-
istic implication ⇒. Formulas are denoted by , , , . . . . We interpret this language using a Kripke-style semantics
as in [8,27], which we deﬁne as follows.
Deﬁnition 1 (Kripke models for intuitionistic propositional logic). Let L be an intuitionistic language. A model for L
is a tupleM = 〈,R, v〉 where  is a set of points, v is a mapping that assigns to each  ∈  a subset of the atoms
of L, andR is a reﬂexive, transitive binary relation over , such that:
(1) (M,)p iff p ∈ v() (for atom p);
(2) (M,)¬ iff for all ′ such thatR(,′), (M,′) ;
(3) (M,)  ∧  iff (M,)  and (M,) ;
(4) (M,)  ⇒  iff for all ′ withR(,′) we have (M,′)  whenever we have (M,′) .
We now deﬁne labelled intuitionistic programs as sets of intuitionistic clauses, where each clause is labelled by the
point at which it holds, similarly to Gabbay’s Labelled Deductive Systems [28].
Deﬁnition 2 (Labelled intuitionistic program). A Labelled Intuitionistic Program is a ﬁnite set of clauses C of the
form i : A1, . . . , An ⇒ A0 (where “,” abbreviates “∧”, as usual), and a ﬁnite set of relations R between points
i (1 im) in C, where Ak (0kn) are atoms and i is a label representing a point in which the associated
clause holds.
In what follows, we deﬁne a model-theoretic semantics for labelled intuitionistic programs. Throughout, we are
concerned with propositional labelled intuitionistic programs, as deﬁned above.
When computing the semantics of the program, we have to consider both the ﬁxed-point at a particular point where
a clause holds and the ﬁxed-point of the program as a whole. When computing the ﬁxed-point at each point, we
have to consider the consequences derived locally and the consequences derived from the interaction between points.
Locally, ﬁxed-points are computed as in a ﬁxed-point semantics for Horn clauses à la van Emden and Kowalski [38,58].
When considering the interaction between points in a Kripke structure, one has to take into account the meaning of
intuitionistic implication ⇒ by following Deﬁnition 1. As for intuitionistic negation ¬, we adopt the approach of
[9,31], as follows. We rename any negative literal ¬A as an atom A′ not present originally in the language. This form
of renaming, as used to represent explicit negation [9], allows our deﬁnition of labelled intuitionistic programs above to
consider atoms A0, A1, . . . , An only, with some of these atoms being negative literals renamed as above. For example,
given A1, . . . , A′k, . . . , An ⇒ A0, where A′k is a renaming of ¬Ak , an interpretation that assigns true to A′k represents
that ¬Ak is true; it does not represent that Ak is false. The atom A′k is called the positive form of the negative literal¬Ak . Following Deﬁnition 1 (intuitionistic negation), A′ will be true in a point i if and only if A does not hold in
every point j such that R(i ,j ). Below, we deﬁne precisely the ﬁxed-point semantics for labelled intuitionistic
programs.
The renaming of negative literals described above allows us to make use of important results from distributed logic
programming reproduced below, and the ﬁxed-point semantics of deﬁnite logic programs. 2 In order to deﬁne a ﬁxed-
point semantics for intuitionistic programs, we simply need to extend the deﬁnition of the consequence operator TP ,
which gives the semantics for deﬁnite programs 3 [38], to cater for intuitionistic implication, as follows.
2 Recall that a deﬁnite logic program is a ﬁnite set of clauses of the form A1, . . . , An → A0, where each Ai , 0 in, is an atom.
3 Given a deﬁnite logic program P , recall that the mapping TP : 2BP → 2BP , where BP denotes the set of atoms occurring in P , is deﬁned as
follows. Let I be an interpretation for P (i.e. a function mapping atoms in BP to {true, false}), then TP (I ) = {A0 ∈ BP | A1, . . . , An → A0 is a
clause in P and {A1, . . . , An} ⊆ I }.
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Deﬁnition 3 (Local consequence operator). Let P = {P1, . . . ,Pk} be a labelled intuitionistic program, where Pi is a
set of clauses that hold in a point i (1 ik). Let BP denote the set of atoms occurring in P , called the Herbrand
base of P . Let I be a Herbrand interpretation 4 for Pi . The mapping ITPi : 2BP → 2BP in i is deﬁned as follows:
ITPi (I ) = {A0, A′0 ∈ BP | A1, . . . , An ⇒ A0 is a clause in a program Pj such thatR(i ,j ) and {A1, . . . , An} ⊆ I
or, in the case of A′0, for all j such thatR(i ,j ), A0 /∈ ITPj (J )}, where ITPj (J ) is deﬁned as ITPi (I ) and J is a
Herbrand interpretation for Pj .
Deﬁnition 4 (Global consequence operator). Let P = {P1, . . . ,Pk} be a labelled intuitionistic program. Let BP be
the Herbrand base of P and Ii be a Herbrand interpretation for Pi (1 ik). The mapping ITP : 2BP → 2BP is
deﬁned as ITP (I1, . . . , Ik) =
⋃k
l=1{ITPl }.
Theorem 1, regarding the ﬁxed-point semantics of distributed deﬁnite logic programs, will be useful.
Deﬁnition 5 (Distributed programs [48]). Deﬁnite distributed logic programs are tuples 〈P1, . . . ,Pn〉 where each Pi
is a set of Horn clauses (forming the program associated with a point i). Each Pi is called a component program of the
composite program.
Theorem 1 (Fixed-point model of distributed programs [48]). For each deﬁnite distributed logic program P ,
the function TP has a unique ﬁxed-point. The sequence of all T mP (I1, . . . , Ik),m∈N, converges to this ﬁxed-point
T P (I1, . . . , Ik), for each Ii ⊆ 2BP .
Clearly, there is a correspondence between distributed programs and labelled programs in the sense that each Pi
corresponds to a set of clauses labelledi . Since we use renaming to deal with intuitionistic negation, we can construct
the semantics of labelled intuitionistic programs by considering the semantics of deﬁnite distributed logic programs.
As a result, Theorem 2 follows directly from Theorem 1.
Theorem 2 (Fixed-point model of labelled intuitionistic programs). For each labelled intuitionistic program P , the
function ITP has a unique ﬁxed-point. The sequence of all ITmP (I1, . . . , Ik),m ∈ N, converges to this ﬁxed-point
ITP (I1, . . . , Ik), for each Ii ⊆ 2BP .
3. Connectionist intuitionistic reasoning
In this section, we introduce a connectionist model for intuitionistic reasoning.We do so by translating the intuitionis-
tic semantics presented above into an ensemble of C-ILP neural networks. 5 First, we recall how C-ILP networks work,
and how ensembles of C-ILP networks can be constructed to represent Kripke’s possible worlds in a Connectionist
Modal Logic setting [22].
We start by intuitively illustrating how we represent Kripke models in neural networks. Fig. 2 shows an ensemble
of three single-hidden-layer neural networks (1,2,3), which might communicate in different ways. We look at
1, 2 and 3 as possible worlds. Input and output neurons may represent L, L or L, where L is a literal, 
denotes modal necessity (L means that L is necessarily true) and  denotes modal possibility (L means that L is
possibly true).
Example 1 (C-ILP ensembles). Intuitively, A will be true in a world i if A is true in all worlds j to which i is
related. Similarly, A will be true in a world i if A is true in some world j to which i is related. A rule of the
form if (1 : A) then (2 : A) could be communicated from network 1 to network 2 by connecting neuron A
in 1 to neuron A in 2 such that, whenever A is activated in 1, A is activated in 2. The connection is shown in
Fig. 3. In addition, one could have feedback connections between networks, e.g. from 2 to 1. For example, a rule of
the form if (2 : A) or (3 : A) then (1 : A) could be implemented by connecting neuron A of 2 and neuron A
4 An interpretation is a function mapping atoms in BP to {true, false}. A model for P is an interpretation that maps P to true.
5 We use the term ensemble to emphasise the fact that learning may be carried out in each network independently.
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Fig. 2. An ensemble of C-ILP networks representing possible worlds.
ω
ω
ω
3
A A
A
h1 h2
2
1
A
 
Fig. 3. Representing modalities in C-ILP ensembles.
of 3 to neuron A of 1 through two hidden neurons (say, h1 and h2) in 1 such that either h1 or h2 is responsible
for activating A. This is also illustrated in Fig. 3.
Due to the simplicity of each C-ILP network, learning can be carried out in each possible world (i.e. each network)
straightforwardly with the use of standard neural learning algorithms. The main problem we have to tackle is that of
how to set up the connections that establish the necessary communication between networks (e.g., between 1 and
2 in Fig. 3). This will depend on the logic under consideration. In the case of modal logic, we connect the networks
according to the possible world semantics for the  and  modalities illustrated in Example 1, and formally deﬁned
as (natural deduction) reasoning rules in [11,28]. In the case of intuitionistic logic, the way we connect the networks
is different. Let us start by giving a simple example of how intuitionistic logic can be represented in this framework.
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Example 2 (Connectionist intuitionistic implication). Consider the intuitionistic program P = {1 : A ⇒ B,
R(1,2)}. Let BP = {A,B,C}. Fig. 4 shows a network ensemble that implements P . According to the seman-
tics of the above intuitionistic implication, 1 : A ⇒ B andR(1,2) imply 2 : A ⇒ B. This can be implemented
by copying the neural representation ofA ⇒ B from1 to2. In Fig. 4,A ⇒ B is implemented through hidden neuron
h such that output neuron B is active if input neuron A is active. P is implemented by copying the implementation of
A ⇒ B from 1 to 2 using h. We will see how this is done exactly in Section 3.2.
Example 3 (Connectionist intuitionistic negation). In addition to the intuitionistic implication, we need to implement
the intuitionistic negation of Deﬁnition 1. Suppose P = {1 : ¬A ⇒ B,R(1,2),R(1,3)}. We implement the
implication as before. However, we must also make sure that ¬A will be derived in 1 if A is not derived in 2 and
3. This can be implemented in the ensemble by connecting the occurrences of A in2 and3 to neuron ¬A in1, as
shown in Fig. 5 with the use of hidden neuron n. The connections must be such that if A is not active in2 and A is not
active in 3 then ¬A is active in 1. The activation of ¬A in 1 should then trigger the activation of B in 1 (since
¬A ⇒ B) using the feedback connection from output neuron ¬A to input neuron ¬A in 1, and then the connection
from ¬A to B (via hidden neuron h) also in 1. Note that, differently from the case of implication, the implementation
of negation will require the use of negative weights (to account for the fact that the non-activation of a neuron, e.g. A,
needs to activate another neuron— in this case, ¬A). In Fig. 5, we use dashed arrows to represent negative weights.
Again, we will see exactly how this is done in Section 3.2.
In what follows, we describe in detail how each network is built (Section 3.1), and then how the networks are
connected to form an ensemble that represents labelled intuitionistic programs (Section 3.2).
3.1. Creating the networks
To create the networks that are used to model each possible world, e.g. 1 in Fig. 2, we use the C-ILP system
[19]. C-ILP is a massively parallel computational model based on artiﬁcial neural networks that integrates inductive
learning and deductive reasoning. In C-ILP, a Translation Algorithm maps a logic programP into a single-hidden-layer
neural networkN such thatN computes the least ﬁxed-point of P . In addition,N can be trained with examples using
backpropagation [49], having P as background knowledge. The knowledge acquired by training can then be extracted
[18], closing the learning cycle, as advocated by Towell and Shavlik [53].
Let us exemplify how the C-ILP Translation Algorithm works. Each rule (rl) of P is mapped from the input layer to
the output layer of N through one neuron (Nl) in the single-hidden layer of N . Intuitively, the Translation Algorithm
from P toN implements a logical and from the input to the hidden layer, and a logical or from the hidden layer to the
output, corresponding to the following conditions: (C1) the input potential of hidden neuron Nl should only exceed its
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Fig. 5. Representing intuitionistic negation.
threshold (l ), activating Nl , when all the positive antecedents of rl are assigned truth-value true while all the negative
antecedents of rl are assigned false; (C2) the input potential of output neuron A should only exceed its threshold (A),
activating A, when at least one hidden neuron Nl that is connected to A is activated.
Example 4 (C-ILP). Consider the logic program P = {r1 : B ∧ C∧ ∼ D → A; r2 : E ∧ F → A; r3 : B} where ∼
stands for negation as failure, and → for Prolog implication [38]. The Translation Algorithm derives the network N
of Fig. 6, setting weights (W) and thresholds () in such a way that conditions (C1) and (C2) above are satisﬁed. Note
that, if N ought to be fully connected, any other link (not shown in Fig. 6) should receive weight zero initially. Note
that each input and output neuron ofN is associated with an atom of P . As a result, each input and output vector ofN
can be associated with an interpretation for P . Note also that each hidden neuron Nl corresponds to a rule rl of P . If
we now connect each output neuron to its counterpart input neuron (e.g. output neuron B to input neuron B), we can
use N to iterate the ﬁxed-point operator of P in parallel, along the lines of [35].
In this paper, we do not need to use negation as failure. Instead, we use intuitionistic negation, following Deﬁnition
1. To do so, we create a neuron (A) to represent positive literals, and another neuron (¬A) to represent negative literals.
This is similar to the use of explicit negation in logic programming, where any negative literal ¬A is renamed as a
new positive literal A′, originally not present in the language [31]. As a result, we only need to worry about the part of
the C-ILP Translation Algorithm that deals with deﬁnite programs. In this case, the network will only contain positive
weights W , since negative weights −W are used to implement negation as failure. The algorithm works as follows.
Notation. Given a deﬁnite logic program P , let q denote the number of rules rl (1 lq) occurring in P; 	, the
number of atoms occurring in P; Amin, the minimum activation for a neuron to be considered active (or true), Amin ∈
(0, 1); Amax, the maximum activation for a neuron to be considered non-active (or false), Amax ∈ (−1, 0); h(x) =
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Fig. 6. Neural network representing logic program P .
2/(1 + e−x) − 1, the bipolar semi-linear activation function with inputs in {−1, 1} 6 ; g(x) = x, the standard linear
activation function; W, the weight of a network connection; l , the threshold of hidden neuron Nl associated with rule
rl ; A0 , the threshold of output neuron A0, where A0 is the head of rule rl ; kl , the number of atoms in the body of rule
rl ; 
l , the number of rules in P with the same atom in the head, for each rule rl ; MAXrl (kl, 
l ), the greater element
among kl and 
l for rule rl ; and MAXP (k1, . . . , kq, 
1, . . . , 
q), the greatest element among all k’s and 
’s of P . We
also use −→k as a shorthand for (k1, . . . , kq), and −→
 as a shorthand for (
1, . . . , 
q).
In the Translation Algorithm (deﬁnite programs) below, we deﬁne Amin, W, l , and A0 such that conditions (C1)
and (C2) above are satisﬁed. Given a deﬁnite logic program P , consider that the atoms of P are numbered from 1 to 	
such that the input and output layers of N are vectors of length 	, where the ith neuron represents the ith atom of P .
We assume, for mathematical convenience and without loss of generality, that Amax = −Amin. We start by calculating
MAXP (
−→
k ,−→
 ) of P and Amin such that: Amin > ((MAXP (−→k,−→
 ) − 1)/(MAXP (−→k,−→
 ) + 1)).
C-ILP translation algorithm
(1) Calculate the value of W such that the following is satisﬁed: W(2/) · (ln (1 + Amin) − ln(1 − Amin))/
(MAXP (
−→
k,−→
 ) · (Amin − 1) + Amin + 1).
(2) For each rule rl of P of the form A1, . . . , Ak → A0 (k0):
(a) add a neuron Nl to the hidden layer of N ;
(b) connect each neuronAi (1 ik) in the input layer to the neuronNl in the hidden layer and set the connection
weight to W ;
(c) connect the neuron Nl in the hidden layer to the neuron A0 in the output layer and set the connection weight
to W ;
(d) deﬁne the threshold (l ) of the neuron Nl in the hidden layer as l = ((1 + Amin) · (kl − 1)/2)W ;
(e) deﬁne the threshold (A0) of the neuron A0 in the output layer as A0 = ((1 + Amin) · (1 − 
l )/2)W .
(3) Set g(x) as the activation function of the neurons in the input layer ofN . In this way, the activation of the neurons
in the input layer of N , given by each input vector i, will represent an interpretation for P .
(4) Set h(x) as the activation function of the neurons in the hidden and output layers ofN . In this way, a gradient-based
learning algorithm, such as Backpropagation, can be applied on N .
Theorem 3 shows that the translation from deﬁnite logic programs to C-ILP neural networks is indeed correct. The
corollary then guarantees that the network converges to the least ﬁxed-point of the program.
Theorem 3 (Correctness of translation algorithm [19,24]). For each deﬁnite logic program P , there exists a feedfor-
ward neural network N with exactly one hidden layer and semi-linear neurons such that N computes the ﬁxed-point
operator TP of P .
6 We use the bipolar semi-linear activation function for convenience. Any monotonically increasing activation function could have been used here.
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Corollary 1 (Connectionist ﬁxed-point computation [19,24]). Let P be a deﬁnite program. There exists a recurrent
neural networkNr with semi-linear neurons such that, starting from an arbitrary initial input,Nr converges to a stable
state and yields the unique ﬁxed-point (T P (I )) of TP .
In order to use a neural network such asN of Fig. 6 as a massively parallel model for logic programming, we simply
need to follow two steps: (i) add neurons to the input and output layers of N , allowing it to be recurrently connected;
and (ii) add the corresponding recurrent connections with ﬁxed weight Wr = 1, so that the activation of output neuron
A feeds back into the activation of input neuron A, the activation of output neuron B feeds back into the activation of
input neuron B, and so on (as shown, e.g., in Fig. 5). For example, given any initial activation to the network of Fig. 6
recurrently connected, it always converges to a stable state in which neuron B is active (true) and all the other neurons
are not active (false), corresponding to the unique ﬁxed-point of P .
A variation of the theorem and corollary above exists for general logic programs (i.e. programs containing negation as
failure) [19]. This variation is restricted to a class of well-behaved programs that, albeit large, needs to exclude certain
programs that might loop or have multiple stable states. In this paper, we do not need to worry about the class that the
program belongs to, since we consider deﬁnite programs only. Then, to compensate for the lack of expressiveness of
deﬁnite programs, we incorporate intuitionistic negation and modal reasoning to the model, aiming to strike a balance
between expressiveness and tractability [60], as illustrated in Section 5.
3.2. Connecting the networks
In this section, we extend the C-ILP system to deal with intuitionistic implication and negation. Given a distributed
(or labelled) deﬁnite program P = 〈P1, . . . ,Pn〉 , we apply the Translation Algorithm presented above n times to
compute the neural counterpart of P , resulting in an ensemble N1, . . . ,Nn of C-ILP neural networks.
In the case of labelled intuitionistic programs, if R(i ,j ) and i : A1, . . . , Ak ⇒ A0, we need to add a
clause of the form A1, . . . , Ak ⇒ A0 to Pj before we apply the Translation Algorithm. To do so, we say that
{i : A1, . . . , Ak ⇒ A0, R(i ,j )} can be written as {i : A1, . . . , Ak ⇒ A0, j : A1, . . . , Ak ⇒ A0}. In order
to represent intuitionistic negation, once the network ensemble has been created, each network containing neurons
labelled as ¬A needs to be connected to each network containing neurons labelled as A (see Fig. 5). More precisely,
whenever R(i ,j ), any output neuron A in Nj needs to be connected to output neuron ¬A in Ni through a new
hidden neuron created in Ni such that, if A is active in Nj then ¬A is not active in Ni . The algorithm below is
responsible for implementing this. In the algorithm, we use atom A′ to represent ¬A, following Gelfond and Lifschitz
renaming of negative literals [31], as explained before.
Let P = {P1, . . . ,Pn} be a labelled intuitionistic program. As in the case of individual C-ILP networks, we start
by calculating MAXP (
−→
k ,−→
 , n) of P and Amin such that: Amin > (MAXP (−→k,−→
 , n) − 1)/(MAXP (−→k,−→
 , n) + 1),
which now also considers the number n of networks (points) in the ensemble.
Intuitionistic algorithm
(1) For each clause cl of the form A1, . . . , Ak ⇒ A0 in Pi (1 in) such thatR(i ,j ) ∈ P, do:
(a) add a clause A1, . . . , Ak ⇒ A0 to Pj (1jn).
(2) For each program Pi (1 in) in P , do:
(a) call the C-ILP Translation Algorithm.
(3) For each atom of the form A′ in a clause cl of Pi , do:
(a) add a hidden neuron NA′ to Ni;
(b) set the step function s(x) as the activation function of NA′ ; 7
(c) set the threshold A′ of NA′ such that n − (1 + Amin) < A′ < nAmin;
7 Any hidden neuron created to encode negation shall use activation function s(x) = y, where y = 1 if x > 0, and y = 0 otherwise; s(x)
is known as the standard non-linear activation function (also called the step function). This is so because these particular hidden neurons encode
(meta-level) knowledge about negation, while the other hidden neurons encode (object-level) knowledge about the problem. The former are not
expected to be trained from examples and, as a result, the use of the step function will simplify the intuitionistic algorithm. The latter are trained
using backpropagation, and therefore require a differentiable, semi-linear activation function instead.
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(d) for each network Nj corresponding to program Pj (1jn) in P such thatR(i ,j ) ∈ P , do:
(i) connect the output neuron A of Nj to the hidden neuron NA′ of Ni and set the connection weight to −1;
(ii) connect the hidden neuron NA′ of Ni to the output neuron A′ of Ni and set the connection weight to WI
such that WI > h−1(Amin)+ 
A′ .W + A′ , where 
A′ , W and A′ are obtained from the C-ILP Translation
Algorithm. 8
Theorem 4 below shows that the translation from intuitionistic programs to C-ILP ensembles is correct. The corollary
then guarantees that the ensemble converges to the least ﬁxed-point of the program.
Theorem 4 (Correctness of intuitionistic algorithm). For each labelled intuitionistic program P , there exists an en-
semble of neural networks N such that N computes the ﬁxed-point operator ITP of P .
Proof. We need to show thatA′ is active inNi if and only if (i) there exists a clause ofPi of the formA1, . . . , Ak ⇒ A′
s.t. A1, . . . , Ak are satisﬁed by an interpretation (input vector ofNi) i, or (ii) for all Pj ∈ P such thatR(i ,j ), there
exists a clause of Pj of the form A1, . . . , Ak ⇒ A such that A is not satisﬁed by an interpretation (input vector of
Nj ) j. Case (i) follows directly from Theorem 3. Case (ii) (if A is not active in any network Nj (0jn) to which
Ni is related to, A′ is active inNi): From the Intuitionistic Algorithm, NA′ is a non-linear hidden neuron inNi . If A is
not active (A < −Amin) inNj , the minimum input potential of NA′ is nAmin − A′ . Since A′ < nAmin (Intuitionistic
Algorithm, step 3c), theminimum input potential ofNA′ is greater than zero and, therefore,NA′ presents activation 1.As
a result, the minimum activation of A′ inNi is h(WI −
A′ .W −A′). Since WI > h−1(Amin)+
A′ .W +A′ , we have
h(WI − 
A′ .W − A′) > Amin and, therefore, A′ is active (A′ > Amin). (if A is active in some networkNj (0jn)
to which Ni is related and for all clauses of the form A1, . . . , Ak ⇒ A′ in Pi , A1, . . . , Ak are not satisﬁed by i (input
vector of Ni) then A′ is not active in Ni): In the worst case, A is not active in n − 1 networks with activation −1, and
active in a single network with activation Amin. In this case, the input potential of NA′ is n− 1−Amin − A′ (recall that
the weights toNA′ are all set to −1). Since A′ > n− (1+Amin) (Intuitionistic Algorithm, step 3c), the maximum input
potential of NA′ is zero and, since s(x) is the activation function of NA′ , NA′ presents activation 0. From Theorem
3, if A1, . . . , Ak are not satisﬁed by i then A′ is not active. Finally, since the activation of NA′ is zero, A′ cannot be
activated by NA′ , so A′ is not active. 
Corollary 2 (Connectionist intuitionistic ﬁxed-point computation). Let P be a labelled intuitionistic program. There
exists an ensemble of recurrent neural networks N r such that, starting from an arbitrary initial input, N r converges
to a stable state and yields the unique ﬁxed-point (ITP (i)) of ITP .
Proof. By Theorem 4, N computes ITP . Recurrently connected, N r computes the upward powers (ITmP (I )) of ITP .
Finally, by Theorem 2, N r converges to the unique ﬁxed-point (ITP (I )) of ITP . 
The following example illustrates the computation of intuitionistic theories using neural network ensembles.
Example 5 (Connectionist intuitionistic ﬁxed-point computation). Consider again the ensemble of Fig. 5. For any ini-
tial set of input vectors (interpretations i, j, . . .) to networksN1,N2,N3, (corresponding to points 1,2,3), output
neuron A will not be activated, either in N2 or in N3. As a result, output neuron A′ will be activated eventually (and
remain activated) in N1. After that, a single step through N1’s recursive connection will activate output neuron B. As
a result, A′ and B will belong to the stable state of N1 and, therefore, to the ﬁxed-point of P1.
4. Connectionist intuitionistic modal reasoning
Intuitionistic modal logic allows for the combination of the strengths of the model theory of modal logics and the
proof theory of intuitionistic logic. This has led to a number of applications in computer science, including program
analysis, formal speciﬁcation and veriﬁcation of computer systems, functional programming, type theory, and program
8 Recall that 
A′ is the number of connections to output neuron A′.
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reﬁnement [2,17,46]. Modal Logic has been found to be appropriate in the study of mathematical necessity (in the
logic of provability), time, knowledge and other modalities [13,25]. In artiﬁcial intelligence, modal logics are perhaps
the most employed knowledge representation formalism used in multi-agent and distributed systems [25].
In what follows, we extend the language of labelled intuitionistic programs to allow the use of the necessity () and
possibility () modal operators, as deﬁned below.
Deﬁnition 6 (Labelled intuitionistic modal program). Amodal atom is of the formMAwhereM ∈ {,} andA is an
atom. A Labelled Intuitionistic Modal Program is a ﬁnite set of clauses C of the form i : MA1, . . . ,MAn ⇒ MA0,
where MAk (0kn) are modal atoms and i is a label representing a point in which the associated clause holds,
and a ﬁnite set of (accessibility) relationsR between points i (1 im) in C.
Formally, truth conditions for necessity and possibility are deﬁned as follows:
(i) (M,) iff for all ′ ∈  ifR(,′) then (M,′) ;
(ii) (M,) iff there exists ′ ∈  such thatR(,′) and (M,′) .
The ﬁxed-point operator for intuitionistic modal programs can now be deﬁned as follows.
Deﬁnition 7 (Intuitionistic modal consequence operator). Let P = {P1, . . . ,Pk} be an intuitionistic modal program,
where Pi is a set of modal intuitionistic clauses that hold in points i (1 ik). Let BP be the Herbrand base of P
and I be a Herbrand interpretation for Pi . The mapping IMTPi : 2BP → 2BP in i is deﬁned as follows:
IMTPi (I ) = {MA0,MA′0 ∈ BP | either (i), (ii), (iii), (iv) or (v) holds}, where:
(i) MA1, . . . ,MAn ⇒ MA0 is a clause in Pi and {MA1, . . . ,MAn} ⊆ I or, in the case of MA′0, for all j such
that R(i ,j ), A0 /∈ IMTPj (J ), where IMTPj (J ) is deﬁned as IMTPi (I ) and J is a Herbrand interpretation for
program Pj ; 9
(ii) MA0 is of the form i : A0, i is a particular possible world uniquely associated with A0, and there exists a world
k such that R(k,i ), and k : MA1, . . . ,MAn → A0 is a clause in Pk , and {MA1, . . . ,MAn} ⊆ K, where K
is a Herbrand interpretation for Pk;
(iii) MA0 is of the form A0 and there exists a world j such that R(i ,j ), and j : MA1, . . . ,MAn → A0 is a
clause in Pj , and {MA1, . . . ,MAn} ⊆ J, where J is a Herbrand interpretation for Pj ;
(iv) MA0 is of the form A0 and for each world j such that R(i ,j ), j : MA1, . . . ,MAn → A0 is a clause in
Pj , and {MA1, . . . ,MAn} ⊆ J, where J is a Herbrand interpretation for Pj ;
(v) MA0 is of the form i : A0 and there exists a world k such that R(k,i ), and k : MA1, . . . ,MAn → A0
is a clause in Pk , and {MA1, . . . ,MAn} ⊆ K, where K is a Herbrand interpretation for Pk .
As before, the Intuitionistic Modal Global Consequence Operator IMTP : 2BP → 2BP is deﬁned as IMTP (I1, . . . ,
Ik) =⋃kl=1{IMTPl }.
We rename each modal atom MAi in P as a new atom Aj not in the language. This allows us to associate an
intuitionistic program to every intuitionistic modal program, so that both programs have the same models. Hence,
Theorem 5 follows directly from Theorem 2.
Theorem 5 (Fixed-point model of labelled intuitionistic modal programs). For each labelled intuitionistic modal pro-
gram P , the function IMTP has a unique ﬁxed-point. The sequence of all IMT mP (I1, . . . , Ik),m ∈ N, converges to this
ﬁxed-point IMT P (I1, . . . , Ik), for each Ii ⊆ 2BP .
Labelled intuitionistic modal programs may be translated into neural network ensembles by extending the above
Intuitionistic Algorithm to cater for the representation of the  and  modal operators. The representation of  and 
has been outlined in Example 1; it emulates the semantics of the operators. In the case of , if  holds at a world
(network) i , appropriate network connections must be set up so that  holds at every world (network) j to which
i is connected (according to the relation R(i ,j )). In the case of , if  holds at a world (network) i , network
connections must be set up so that  holds at an arbitrary world (network) j to which i is connected, reﬂecting the
9 Note that item (i) simply generalises the deﬁnition of the ﬁxed-point operator for intuitionistic programs (Deﬁnition 3).
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Fig. 7. The ensemble of networks representing program P1.
semantics of the  modality. Example 6 shows how modalities can be implemented in neural networks using CML
[22,23]. The example illustrates the key ideas underlying our approach to encodemodalities in neural networks.Wewill
make use of these ideas to incorporate modalities in the intuitionistic model of Section 3. A case study on intuitionistic
modal reasoning, including the appropriate calculation of weights, will then be considered in Section 5.
Example 6 (CML). Let P1 = {1 : r → q, 1 : s → r, 2 : s, 3 : q → p, R(1,2), R(1,3)}. We start
by applying the C-ILP Translation Algorithm, which creates three neural networks to represent the worlds 1, 2, and
3 (see Fig. 7). Then, we use CML to create hidden neurons labelled by {M,∨,∧}. 10 The remaining neurons are all
created using the Translation Algorithm. For the sake of clarity, unconnected input and output neurons are not shown
in Fig. 7. Note how output neuron q in 1 connects to output neuron q in both 2 and 3 (via hidden neurons M).
Connections must be such that whenever q is activated in 1, q is activated in 2 and in 3. Dually, whenever q
is activated in both 2 and 3, q must be activated in 1. This is implemented by the use of hidden neuron ∧ and
recurrent (feedback) connections in the ensemble. In the case of output neuron s in 1, in this example, 2 has been
chosen to encode a neuron s such that whenever s is activated in 1, s is activated in 2 (as before, via a hidden
neuron M). Dually, in the case of , whenever s is activated either in 2 or in 3, output neuron s must be activated
in 1. We use hidden neuron ∨ and recurrent connections in the ensemble to implement this. As for the computation
of logical consequences, we recurrently connect in 1 output neurons s and r to input neurons s and r , respectively,
and in 3, output neuron q to input neuron q. The ensemble will compute {s, r,q} in 1, {s, q} in 2, and {q,p}
in 3. 11 As expected, these are some of the logical consequences of the original program P1.
We are now in a position to introduce the Intuitionistic Modal Algorithm. Let P = {P1, . . . ,Pn} be a labelled
intuitionistic modal program with clauses of the form i : MA1, . . . , MAk → MA0, where each Aj is an atom and
M ∈ {,}, 1 in, 0jk.
10 This will be detailed in the algorithm presented below, steps 2–5, which implement the reasoning rules for modalities in neural networks.
11 Although the actual computation is to be done in parallel, following it by starting from facts (such as s in 2) might help verifying it: s is a fact
in 2; it gives s in 1, which in turn gives r and q in 1. q in 1 renders q in both 2 and 3, and q in 3 renders p in 3.
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As in the case of intuitionistic programs, we start by calculating MAXP (
−→
k ,−→
 , n) of P and Amin such that:
Amin > (MAXP (
−→
k,−→
 , n) − 1)/(MAXP (−→k,−→
 , n) + 1). Let WM ∈ R be such that WM > h−1(Amin) + 
lW + A,
where 
l , W and A are obtained from the C-ILP Translation Algorithm.
Intuitionistic modal algorithm
(1) For each Pi in P do:
(a) rename each modal atom MAj by a new atom not occurring in P of the form Aj if M = , or Aj if
M = ; 12
(b) call Intuitionistic Algorithm.
(2) For each output neuron Aj in network Ni , do:
(a) add a hidden neuron AMj and an output neuron Aj to an arbitrary network Nz such thatR(i ,z);
(b) set the step function s(x) as the activation function of AMj , and set the semi-linear function h(x) as the
activation function of Aj ;
(c) connect Aj in Ni to AMj and set the connection weight to 1;
(d) set the threshold M of AMj such that −1 < M < Amin;
(e) set the threshold Aj of Aj in Nz such that Aj = ((1 + Amin) · (1 − 
l )/2)W ;
(f) connect AMj to Aj in Nz and set the connection weight to WM .
(3) For each output neuron Aj in network Ni , do:
(a) add a hidden neuron AMj to each Nu (1un) such thatR(i ,u), and add an output neuron Aj to Nu if
Aj /∈ Nu;
(b) set the step function s(x) as the activation function of AMj , and set the semi-linear function h(x) as the
activation function of Aj ;
(c) connect Aj in Ni to AMj and set the connection weight to 1;
(d) set the threshold M of AMj such that −1 < M < Amin;
(e) set the threshold Aj of Aj in each Nu such that Aj = ((1 + Amin) · (1 − 
l )/2)W ;
(f) connect AMj to Aj in Nu and set the connection weight to WM .
(4) For each output neuron Aj in network Nu such thatR(i ,u), do:
(a) add a hidden neuron A∨j to Ni;
(b) set the step function s(x) as the activation function of A∨j ;
(c) for each output neuron Aj in Ni , do:
(i) connect Aj in Nu to A∨j and set the connection weight to 1;
(ii) set the threshold ∨ of A∨j such that −nAmin < ∨ < Amin − (n − 1);
(iii) connect A∨j to Aj in Ni and set the connection weight to WM .
(5) For each output neuron Aj in network Nu such thatR(i ,u), do:
(a) add a hidden neuron A∧j to Ni;
(b) set the step function s(x) as the activation function of A∧j ;
(c) for each output neuron Aj in Ni , do:
(i) connect Aj in Nu to A∧j and set the connection weight to 1;
(ii) set the threshold ∧ of A∧j such that n − (1 + Amin) < ∧ < nAmin;
(iii) connect A∧j to Aj in Ni and set the connection weight to WM .
Let us now illustrate the use of the Intuitionistic Modal Algorithm with the following example.
12 This allows us to treat each MAj as an atom and to apply the Intuitionistic Algorithm directly to Pi by labelling neurons as Aj , Aj , or
simply Aj .
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Fig. 8. The ensemble of networks representing program P2.
Example 7. Let P2 = {1 : A ⇒ B, 1 : A, 2 : C, R(1,2), R(1,3)}. We apply the Intuitionistic Modal
Algorithm, which creates three neural networks N1, N2 and N3 to represent the points 1, 2, and 3, respectively
(Fig. 8). Then, hidden neurons labelled M , ∧ and n are created to interconnect networks in the ensemble. Taking N1,
output neuron A needs to be connected to output neurons A in N2 and N3 (Intuitionistic Modal Algorithm, step 3).
This is done using hidden neurons labelled M . Dually, output neurons A inN2 andN3 need to be connected to output
neuron A inN1 using hidden neuron ∧ (Intuitionistic Modal Algorithm, step 5). Since 1 : A ⇒ B,R(1,2), and
R(1,3), A ⇒ B is copied to N2 and N3 (Intuitionistic Algorithm, step 1a). Intuitionistic negation is implemented
using neurons labelled n, as illustrated inN1 for C′ (Intuitionistic Algorithm, step 3). Note that neuron C inN2 would
need to be connected to a network Nj if there was a relation R(2,j ) for some j (Intuitionistic Modal Algorithm,
step 2a). The computation of P2 in the ensemble leads to the following result: A is computed in N1 and C is
computed inN2. From A inN1, A is computed inN2 andN3. From A and A ⇒ B inN2 andN3, B is computed in
N2 andN3, respectively. Since C does not hold in bothN2 andN3, C′ is computed inN1. Note that, for reﬂexivity, the
addition ofR(1,1) toP2, for example, would allow one to deriveA fromA inN1 (Intuitionistic Modal Algorithm,
step 3). In summary, the logical consequences computed by the network are: 1 : {¬C}, 2 : {A,B}, and 3 : {A,B}.
Finally, let us show that the ensemble of neural networksN obtained from the above Intuitionistic Modal Algorithm
is equivalent to the original intuitionistic modal program P , in the sense that N computes the intuitionistic modal
consequence operatorIMTP of P (Deﬁnition 7). The proof for the intuitionistic modal algorithm follows that of the
intuitionistic algorithm (Theorem 4), and makes use of the correctness results of CML [23].
Theorem 6 (Correctness of intuitionistic modal algorithm). For any intuitionistic modal program P there exists an
ensemble of neural networks N such that N computes the intuitionistic modal ﬁxed-point operator IMTP of P .
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Proof. We know from Theorem 3 that C-ILPs Translation Algorithm is correct. We know from [23] that the addition
of modalities to C-ILP is correct. We also know from Theorem 4 that the addition of intuitionistic negation to C-ILP is
correct. The only case we need to consider now is when modalities and negation are to be represented together in the
same network (e.g., in network 1 of Fig. 8). Consider an output neuron A0 with a neuron M and a neuron n among its
predecessors in a network’s hidden layer. There are four cases to consider. (i) Both M and n neurons are not activated:
since the activation function of M and n is the step function, their activation is zero. As a result, Theorem 3 applies.
(ii) Only M neurons are activated: CML guarantees that A0 is activated with minimum input potential WM + , where
 ∈ R. (iii) Only n neurons are activated: Theorem 4 guarantees that A0 is activated with minimum input potential
WI + . (iv) Both M and n neurons are activated: the input potential of A0 is at least WM + WI + . Since WM > 0
and WI > 0, and since the activation function of A0 (h(x)) is monotonically increasing, A0 is activated whenever both
M and n are activated. 
Corollary 3 (Connectionist intuitionistic modal ﬁxed-point computation). Let P be a labelled intuitionistic modal
program. There exists an ensemble of recurrent neural networks N r such that, starting from an arbitrary initial
input, N r converges to a stable state and yields the unique ﬁxed-point (IMT P (I )) of IMTP .
Proof. By Theorem 6, N computes IMTP . Recurrently connected, N r computes the upward powers of IMTP
(IMT
m
P (I )). Finally, by Theorem 5, N r converges to the unique ﬁxed-point of IMTP (IMT P (I )). 
5. An application of connectionist intuitionism
Since its origins, intuitionistic logics have been used as the logical foundations of constructive mathematics and,
more recently, in several areas of computation. For instance, Artemov has developed a semantics for Godel’s logics of
proofs based on intuitionism [3]. Moreover, an intuitionistic temporal logic has been successfully used to characterise
timing analysis in combinatorial circuits [44], and intuitionistic logics have been shown relevant to spatial reasoning
with possible applications in geographical information systems. Bennett’s propositional intuitionistic approach [6]
provided for tractable yet expressive reasoning about topological and spatial relations, in contrast with more involved
(ﬁrst-order) reasoning frameworks. Intuitionistic modal logics have also been used to characterise notions of knowledge
in philosophical logic, and more recently in artiﬁcial intelligence [47,51].
In this section, we apply the model proposed above to an archetypal testbed for distributed knowledge representation,
namely, the wise men puzzle [25]. Our aim is to ground the theoretical work presented above in a practical example,
showing that the type of neural network architecture advocated above may well be required in a connectionist setting
to represent even a simple situation in distributed commonsense reasoning. Although simple, the wise men puzzle
has been used extensively to model reasoning about knowledge in distributed, multi-agent environments [25,33]. This
and other puzzles have been shown suitable not only due to their simplicity, but also because of their generality as
they represent typical situations occurring in practice in distributed, multi-agent environments. Below, we follow the
description of the puzzle given in [36], and show how one can model it by using the computational model proposed in
the sections above.
5.1. The wise men puzzle
A certain king wishes to test his three wise men. He arranges them in a circle so that they can see and hear each
other. They are all perceptive, truthful and intelligent, and this is common knowledge in the group. It is also common
knowledge among them that there are three red hats and two white hats, and ﬁve hats in total. The king places a hat on
the head of each wise man in a way that they are not able to see the colour of their own hats, and then asks each one
whether they know the colour of the hat on their heads.
As there are only two white hats, at least one of them is wearing a red hat. The ﬁrst wise man says he does not know
the colour of his hat; the second wise man says he does not know either. Then the third wise man, if he sees two white
hats, should be able to say that he knows the colour of the hat on his head. If not, it becomes common knowledge that
there must exist at most a single white hat on their heads (because, if there were two, a wise man would have said, in
the previous round, that he knew he was wearing a red hat). A wise man that can see such a white hat should then be
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able to conclude that he is wearing a red hat. Again, if they all fail to reach such a conclusion, then it becomes common
knowledge that they all must be wearing red hats.
The puzzle illustrates a situationwhere intuitionistic implication and intuitionistic negation occur.Knowledge evolves
in time, with the current knowledge persisting in time. For example, at the ﬁrst round it is known that there are at most
two white hats. Then, if the wise men get to the second round, it becomes known that there is at most one white hat on
their heads. This new knowledge subsumes the previous knowledge, which in turn persists. This means that if A ⇒ B
is true at a point t1 then A ⇒ B will be true at a point t2 that is related to t1 (intuitionistic implication). Now, in any
situation in which a wise man knows that his hat is red (and therefore not white), this knowledge—constructed with
the use of sound reasoning processes—cannot be refuted. In other words, if ¬A is true at point t1 then A cannot be true
at a point t2 that is related to t1 (intuitionistic negation).
To model the puzzle, we do the following. Let pi denote the fact that wise man i wears a red hat, i ∈ {1, 2, 3}. We
enumerate the seven possibilities which exist by using RRR to denote p1 ∧p2 ∧p3 (i.e. the ﬁrst wise man wears a red
hat, the second wise man wears a red hat, and the third wise man wears a red hat), RRW to denote p1 ∧ p2 ∧ ¬p3 (i.e.
the ﬁrst wise man wears a red hat, the second wise man wears a red hat, and the third wise man wears a white hat), and
so on. Note that WWW is immediately ruled out as there are only two white hats.
The seven possibilities are: RRR, RRW, RWR, WRR, RWW, WRW, and WWR. The reasoning of the wise men
progresses as follows: if the second and third men hear the ﬁrst answering no, they rule out the possibility of the true
situation being RWW, since if this were the case, the ﬁrst man would have answered yes upon seeing the others wearing
white hats, and knowing that there were only two white hats. If he said no, RWW is ruled out.
If the third man then hears the second man answering no, he rules out the possibility of the situation being WRW,
since if it were the case, the second wise man would have answered yes. The third wise man would also rule out the
RRW possibility, for if the second wise man had seen the ﬁrst wearing red and the third wearing white, knowing that
the ﬁrst wise man had said no, he would have concluded that the true situation was RRW, i.e. that he was wearing a red
hat. This reasoning process continues until one of the wise men is capable of concluding whether or not he is wearing
a red hat.
The reasoning process above is intuitionistic. Given some limited information with respect to knowledge about a
situation, further knowledge has to be derived so that the solution can be reached eventually. This means that knowledge
is acquired at each time round, allowing an intelligent agent to infer a conclusion eventually from his knowledge base.
The task at hand, in our neural-symbolic system, is to represent this reasoning process, and then construct the network
ensembles that correspond to it, as exempliﬁed below.
5.2. Connectionist representation of the wise men puzzle
We model the wise men puzzle by constructing the relative knowledge of each wise man along time points. This
allows us to explicitly represent the relativistic notion of knowledge, which is a fundamental principle of intuitionistic
reasoning. For simplicity, we refer to wise man 1 (respectively, 2 and 3) as agent 1 (respectively, 2 and 3). We model
the relative knowledge of each agent at points t1, t2 and t3 in the Kripke structure, each point being associated with
a discrete time point. The resulting model is a two-dimensional network ensemble (agents × time), containing three
networks in each dimension. In addition to pi—denoting the fact that wise man i wears a red hat—to model each
agent’s individual knowledge, we need to use a modality Kj , j ∈ {1, 2, 3}, which represents the relative notion of
knowledge at each point. Thus, Kjpi denotes the fact that agent j knows that agent i wears a red hat. The K modality
above corresponds to themodality in intuitionistic modal reasoning, as customary in the logics of knowledge [4,25],
and as exempliﬁed below.
First, we model the fact that each agent knows the colour of the others’ hats. This is illustrated in Fig. 9. For example,
if wise man 3 wears a red hat (neuron p3 is active) then wise man 1 knows that wise man 3 wears a red hat (neuron
Kp3 is active for wise man 1). This is an example of intuitionistic implication t1 : p3 ⇒ K1p3, which clearly persist
at points t2 and t3. In other words, the structure of Fig. 9 repeats itself twice, as it should be valid for each point in
the Kripke structure (t1, t2, t3), given thatR(t1, t2) andR(t2, t3). This creates the two-dimensional network ensemble
mentioned above. Note that, according to the Intuitionistic Modal Algorithm, connections linking different networks
in the ensemble receive weight 1.0, as depicted in Fig. 9.
We now need to model the reasoning process of each wise man. In this example, let us consider the case RWR (i.e.
we make neurons p1 and p3 active). For agent 1, we have the rule t1 : K1¬p2 ∧ K1¬p3 ⇒ K1p1, which states that
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man 2
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man 3
Kp3
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man 1p1 Kp2 Kp3Kp1
p2 Kp2Kp1
p3 Kp2 Kp3Kp1
1 1
1
1
1 1
Fig. 9. Wise men puzzle: each agent knows the colour of the others’ hats.
agent 1 can deduce that he is wearing a red hat if he knows that the other agents are both wearing white hats. Analogous
rules exist for agents 2 and 3. As before, the implication is intuitionistic, so that it persists at t2 and t3 as depicted in
Fig. 10 for wise man 1. In addition, according to the interpretation of intuitionistic negation, we may only conclude that
agent 1 knows ¬p2, if in every world that agent 1 envisages, p2 is not derived. This is illustrated with the use of dotted
lines in Fig. 10. 13 In the case of RWR, the network ensemble will never derive p2 (as one should expect), and thus
it will derive K1¬p2 and K3¬p2. Note that, according to the Intuitionistic Algorithm, connections linking different
networks receive weight −1.0, as depicted in Fig. 10.
Finally, to complete the formalisation of the problem, we know that, at t1, it is common knowledge that there exist
at most two white hats. As the reasoning process takes us into t2 (in the case RWR), it becomes common knowledge
that there exists at most one white hat. As a result, the following rules hold at t2 (and at t3) : K1¬p2 ⇒ K1p1 and
K1¬p3 ⇒ K1p1. Analogous rules exist for agents 2 and 3. If the reasoning process were to take us into t3 (the only
case here would be RRR) then it would be common knowledge that there are no white hats. This can be modelled by
the rule t3 : K1p2 ∧ K1p3 ⇒ K1p1. Again, analogous rules exist for agents 2 and 3 at t3.
A set ofweights for the networks in the ensemble of Fig. 10 is given in Table 1. In the table, we use (X, Y ) to denote the
weight from neuronX to neuron Y , and X to denote the threshold of neuronX in a particular neural network. First, we
calculateAmin > ((MAXP (
−→
k,−→
 )−1)/(MAXP (−→k,−→
 )+1)), i.e.Amin > (MAXP (2, 2)−1)/(MAXP (2, 2)+1). Take
Amin = 0.6.Then, taking = 1,we calculateW(2/)·(ln (1 + Amin)−ln (1 − Amin))/(MAXP (−→k,−→
 )·(Amin − 1)+
13 Recall that the accessibility relation is reﬂexive and transitive, so that the intuitionistic algorithm also connects, e.g., K1p2 in t3 to K1¬p2 in
t1, and K1p2 in ti to K1¬p2 in ti , i ∈ {1, 2, 3}. For simplicity, we have omitted such connections.
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wise man 1 at point t1
K¬p2 K¬p3
K¬p2
Kp1
K¬p3
Kp2 Kp3
wise man 1 at point t2
K¬p2 K¬p3
K¬p2
Kp1
K¬p3
Kp2 Kp3
wise man 1 at point t3
K¬p2 K¬p3
K¬p2
Kp1
K¬p3
Kp2 Kp3
h1 h2 h3 h4 h5
h1 h2 h3 h4 h5
h1 h2 h3 h4 h5
−1
−1
−1
−1
Fig. 10. Wise men puzzle: intuitionistic negation and implication.
Amin + 1), i.e. W2(ln(1.6)− ln(0.4))/(2(−0.4)+ 1.6) = 1.1552. Let W = 2.0. Thus, all feedforward connections
that are created byC-ILPsTranslationAlgorithmwill receiveweight 2.0. In addition, recall that all feedback connections
that are created by the Translation Algorithm receive weight 1.0. The next step is to calculate the thresholds of hidden
and output neurons. The threshold of h1 is given by the Translation Algorithm: l = ((1 + Amin) · (kl − 1) /2)W , i.e.
h1 = 1.6. The thresholds of h2 and h3 are given by the Intuitionistic Modal Algorithm: −1 < M < Amin. We let
h2, h3 equal zero. 14 The thresholds of h4 and h5 are given by the Intuitionistic Modal Algorithm: n− (1+Amin) <
A′ < nAmin, i.e. 1.4 < A′ < 1.8. We let h4, h5 equal 1.5. The threshold of any output neuron is given by the
Translation Algorithm: A0 = ((1 + Amin) · (1 − 
l )/2)W . Since 
l = 1, these are all zero. Finally, we consider the
feedforward connections that are created by the Intuitionistic Modal Algorithm. These are (h2,Kp2) and (h3,Kp3) for
each network. According to the algorithm, these weights should be greater than h−1(Amin) + 
lW + A = 2.986. 15
We set these to 4.0 (see Table 1).
In conclusion, it is interesting noting that the connectionist intuitionistic approach to solve the wise men puzzle
presented above produces a neater model than our previous connectionist approach, in which an agent’s lack of
14 Note that information coming from agents 2 and 3 are gathered by agent 1 via hidden neurons h2 and h3.
15 Note that h−1(Amin) = −(1/) ln((1 − Amin)/(1 + Amin)).
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Table 1
A valid set of weights for the network of Fig. 10
Wise man 1 at t1 Wise man 1 at t2 Wise man 1 at t3
h1 = 1.6 h1 = 1.6 h1 = 1.6
h2 = 0.0 h2 = 0.0 h2 = 0.0
h3 = 0.0 h3 = 0.0 h3 = 0.0
h4 = 1.5 h4 = 1.5 h4 = 1.5
h5 = 1.5 h5 = 1.5 h5 = 1.5
(K¬p2, h1) = 2.0 (K¬p2, h1) = 2.0 (K¬p2, h1) = 2.0
(K¬p3, h1) = 2.0 (K¬p3, h1) = 2.0 (K¬p3, h1) = 2.0
(h1,Kp1) = 2.0 (h1,Kp1) = 2.0 (h1,Kp1) = 2.0
(h2,Kp2) = 4.0 (h2,Kp2) = 4.0 (h2,Kp2) = 4.0
(h3,Kp3) = 4.0 (h3,Kp3) = 4.0 (h3,Kp3) = 4.0
(h4,K¬p2) = 2.0 (h4,K¬p2) = 2.0 (h4,K¬p2) = 2.0
(h5,K¬p3) = 2.0 (h5,K¬p3) = 2.0 (h5,K¬p3) = 2.0
(K¬p2,K¬p2) = 1.0 (K¬p2,K¬p2) = 1.0 (K¬p2,K¬p2) = 1.0
(K¬p3,K¬p3) = 1.0 (K¬p3,K¬p3) = 1.0 (K¬p3,K¬p3) = 1.0
Kp1 = 0.0 Kp1 = 0.0 Kp1 = 0.0
Kp2 = 0.0 Kp2 = 0.0 Kp2 = 0.0
Kp3 = 0.0 Kp3 = 0.0 Kp3 = 0.0
K¬p2 = 0.0 K¬p2 = 0.0 K¬p2 = 0.0
K¬p3 = 0.0 K¬p3 = 0.0 K¬p3 = 0.0
knowledge needed to be modelled, requiring the use of two different types of negation, namely, explicit negation and
negation as failure, instead of intuitionistic negation only [22].
6. Concluding remarks
In this paper, we have presented a new model of computation that integrates neural networks and intuitionistic
reasoning. We have deﬁned a class of labelled intuitionistic (modal) programs, and then presented algorithms to
translate the intuitionistic theories into ensembles of C-ILP neural networks, and showed that the ensembles compute a
ﬁxed-point semantics of the corresponding theories. As a result, each ensemble can be seen as a new massively parallel
model for the computation of intuitionistic (modal) logic. In addition, since each network can be trained efﬁciently
using a neural learning algorithm, e.g. backpropagation [49], one can adapt the network ensemble by training possible
world representations from examples. Work along these lines has been done in [20–22], where learning experiments
in possible worlds settings were investigated. As future work, we shall consider learning experiments based on the
intuitionistic model introduced in this paper.
Extensions of the work presented in this paper could include the study of how to represent properties of other
non-classical logics (such as branching time temporal logics [29,40], conditional logic of normality [10], relevance
and linear logics [1]), and of inference and learning of fragments of ﬁrst-order logic (as it is well known that there
exists a correspondence between propositional modal logics and fragments of ﬁrst-order logics [60]), as well as logical
formalisms for representing probabilities and reasoning under uncertainty [33]. In addition, as the Curry-Howard
isomorphism (see e.g. [1]) establishes a relationship between intuitionism and typed -calculus (i.e. typed functional
programs), it would be interesting to exploit this relationship with respect to the connectionist model presented here,
so that one could present such concepts in a connectionist computational foundation.
As advocated by Valiant [57], the characterisation of a semantics for cognitive computation requires the development
of effective integrated learning and reasoning algorithms and architectures. We believe that the foundation presented
here contributes to this goal; it also opens several interesting research avenues, including applications of the model in
the domain of distributed and multi-agent systems [25] in the style presented in [20,22].
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